Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Harry D. Pugsley; Pugsley, Hayes, and Rampton.
Moreton, Christensen and Christensen.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, No. 8719.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1556
3CUMENT 
ru BRIEF 
J . J . 1 IT • • • • M W A X L U A ' I U V / V / U u l 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. ) Case No. 8719 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. ) Case No. 8720 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FELT SYNDICATE, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8736 
REPLY BRIEF OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT 
& INDEMNITY COMPANY ON APPEAL 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN 
& CHRISTENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Company. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 2 
I. FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
AS TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT, WHICH IT ASSIGNED TO WRIGHT-
WIRTHLIN 3 
II. THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPER-
LY RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER 
TO FELT'S COMPLAINT 8 
III. THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSA-
DY'S SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWL-
EDGE, NOR CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS 
WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE HARTFORD, OR ESTOP 
IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR WHICH IT 
CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND ON 
THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND 10 
IV. THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT 
HAVE THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIOR 
BREACHES ON THE PART OF ANY OF THE PAR-
TIES. THE HARTFORD DID NOT BY SIGNING 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT WAIVE ANY 
BREACHES UPON THE PART OF FELT OR PRU-
DENTIAL FEDERAL 12 
V. FELT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING ITS AC-
TION AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL 
BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 16-9-3, U.C.A., 
1953 15 
VI. HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL 
BRIEF THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSO-
EVER 16 
VII. HARTFORD DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE OBLIGEES WERE JOINT AND 
SEVERAL 17 
CONCLUSION 19 
TEXTS CITED 
41 Am. Jur. page 397 9 
2 Moore's Federal Practice, pages 56-7 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX—(Continued) 
Page 
STATUTES CITED 
Sec. 16-9-3, U.C.A. 1953 15 
Sec. 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953. 15 
Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Yosemite Mining & Milling Co., (Utah), 35 Pac. 
502 5 
Bank of American Fork v. Smith, (Ut,), 140 Pac. 122 6 
George R. Barse Livestock Co. v. The Range Valley Cattle 
Co., et al., 16 Ut. 59, 50 Pac. 630 16 
Marchant v. National Reserve Co, of America, 137 Pac. (2d) 
331 16 
Moss v. Taylor, (Ut.), 273 Pac. 515 6 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R, Co., (Ut.), 
137 Pac. 643 5 
Shaw v. Jeppson, (Ut.), 239 Pac. (2d) 745 3 
Wilson v. Kiesel, et al., (Ut,), 35 Pac. 488 ....4-7 
Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ray. C, (Ut.), 33 Pac. 1042 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
©I the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
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- ( Case No. 8719 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. > Case No. 8720 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FELT SYNDICATE, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8736 
REPLY BRIEF OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT 
& INDEMNITY COMPANY ON APPEAL 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Hartford deems it advisable to submit a brief reply 
to the briefs filed on behalf of the respective plaintiffs 
in the above consolidated cases. We shall treat first, the 
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points made by Felt on its appeal, and subsequently the 
points raised by the various plaintiffs in response to 
the contentions of the Hartford. In this brief, we shall 
designate the parties in the same manner as followed 
in our original brief, and we shall also refer to the record 
by the same system of designations. 
POINTS TO BE ABGUED 
POINT I. 
FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS 
TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, 
WHICH IT ASSIGNED TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPERLY 
RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER TO FELT'S 
COMPLAINT. 
POINT III. 
THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSADY'S 
SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWLEDGE, NOR 
CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE 
HARTFORD, OR ESTOP IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR 
WHICH IT CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND 
ON THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE 
THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIOR BREACHES ON THE 
PART OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE HARTFORD DID 
NOT BY SIGNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
WAIVE ANY BREACHES UPON THE PART OF FELT OR 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL. 
POINT V. 
FELT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING ITS ACTION 
AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL BY THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTION 10-9-3, U. C. A., 1953. 
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POINT VI. 
HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF 
THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER. 
POINT VII. 
HARTFORD DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE OBLIGEES WERE JOINT AND SEVERAL. 
POINT I. 
FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS 
TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, 
WHICH IT ASSIGNED TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN. 
Felt claims, on its appeal, that notwithstanding that 
it had assigned to Wright-Wirthlin 89.6% interest in 
its right to receive funds from the miscellaneous account 
under the primary construction contract, (Ex. Pr.-2), 
that it was nonetheless the real party in interest and 
entitled to bring this action. The argument is falsely 
premised. The purpose of the real party in interest stat-
utes was not to protect the interest of the equitable owner 
of the chose en action, but to protect the obligor. This 
court recently said in Shaw v. Jeppson, (Ut.), 239 Pac. 
(2d) 745: 
"The reason the defendant has the right to 
have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party 
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude 
any action on the same demand by another and 
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or 
counterclaims available against the real owner of 
the cause.'' 
Felt refers to ancient common law principles, and 
then argues, by analogy to the principles of contracts 
for the benefit of third party beneficiaries, that it is 
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entitled to bring this action, and that it is the real party 
in interest. The analogies upon which it attempts to pro-
ceed are false, and whatever may have been the rules 
in the ancient common law, the rule has been well estab-
lished in this jurisdiction, from the beginning of state-
hood, that the assignee of a chose en action is the real 
party in interest, and the one entitled to bring the suit. 
In Wines vs. Rio Grande W. By. Co., (Ut.), 33 Pac. 
1042, this court said: 
"So it is held that an assignee is the real 
party im interest, and it is immaterial whether 
or not any consideration was actually paid for 
the assignment, or whether or not the assignment 
was merely made for the purpose of the suit, if it 
was in fact made." (Emphasis ours.) 
In Wilson v. Kiesel, et al., (Ut.), 35 Pac. 488, this 
court said at page 491 : 
"The statute of Utah (2 Comp. Laws 1888, 
# 3169), declares that every action must be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest, 
except certain cases, which do not in any wise 
affect the question at bar. This language does not 
admit of doubt as to its meaning. The real party 
in interest at the beginning of the action must 
prosecute it in his own name. It is not necessary 
to enlarge upon the reasons for this rule, or to 
cite decisions under it; it is sufficient for us to 
know what the law is, and it is our duty to enforce 
it, _ 
"* * * As the nominal plaintiff, Wilson, had 
no judgment or other cause of action against these 
defendants when he brought them into court, it is 
quite apparent that he cannot, in justice complain 
if his action is dismissed at his cost, and the as-
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signee cannot complain, because he has never 
sought any judgment against defendants." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
In Anderson vs. Yosemite Mining & Milling Co., 
(Ut.), 35 Pac. 502, this court said at page 503: 
"Upon an examination of the record, we find 
that the contention of the .appellant cannot be 
sustained. * * * The fact that plaintiff still re-
tained the note in his possession would not de-
prive the assignee of the right to sue thereon in 
accordance with the contract between the parties. 
Having authority to sue, Scott and Eemington 
could sue one or all of the makers. The assign-
ment carried with it the note and debt evidenced 
thereby. Scott and Eemington [the assignees] 
were the real parties in interest and entitled to 
sue." (Emphasis ours.) 
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. 
Co., (Ut.), 137 Pac. 643, this court said: 
"Comp. Laws 1907, #2902, provides: 'Every 
action must be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest, except that an executor or 
administrator, a trustee of ,an express trust, or 
a person expressly authorized by statute may sue 
without joining with him the person for whose 
benefit the action is prosecuted. * * *' 
«* # * ^ r p o m e r o y , in his excellent work 
on Code Remedies (4th Ed.) , #127, in referring 
to the rule that all actions should be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest, says: 
'Not only does the rule prevail when the assign-
ment is absolute and complete and the assignee 
is the legal owner of the demand; it prevails with 
equal force in cases where the assignment is 
simply equitable in its character; and the as-
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signee's title would not have been recognized in 
any form by a court of law under the old system, 
but would have been purely equitable. Such as-
signee, being the real party in interest, must bring 
the action in his own name.' " (Emphasis ours.) 
In Bank of American Fork v. Smith, (Ut.), 140 Pac. 
122, this court said at page 125: 
"We think that, when the agreement and the 
transactions had under it are considered as a 
whole, what Mr. Jensen did in obtaining money 
from the plaintiff at least amounted to an equit-
able assignment of the obligations assumed by, 
as well as the rights arising under the agreement 
to the plaintiff. * * * We have recently held that 
under our constitution and statutes the equitable 
assignee of a chose in action is the real party in 
interest, and may sue as such assignee, notwith-
standing that such could not have been done at 
common law." (Emphasis ours.) 
In Moss v. Taylor, (Ut.), 273 P,ac. 515, this court 
said at page 520: 
"The assignee of a cause of action is a real 
party in interest ,and may prosecute an assigned 
cause of action in his own name under the pro-
visions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, #6495, although 
the assignment was made without consideration or 
was made solely for the purpose of bringing an 
action." (Emphasis ours.) 
The rule laid down by this line of decisions has 
never been disturbed, and seems now to be so well estab-
lished that there has been no occasion for this court 
to pass upon it in recent years. It follows therefore, that 
Felt was not the real party in interest, at least as to 
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89.6% of the claim, and the court properly refused to 
allow it any recovery on that portion. 
Felt attempts to derive comfort from the fact that 
Wright-Wirthlin reassigned its rights to Felt by an in-
strument dated December 20, 1956 (Ex. F-35). This was 
the date on which trial of these actions commenced. Felt 
did not have this right at the time it commenced suit, 
or at any time prior to trial. It could not, by a trans-
action occurring after the commencement of suit assert 
or enforce a right which it did not have at the time suit 
was commenced. Wilson v. Kiesel, ( U i ) , 35 Pac. 488. 
Moreover, this right had completely lapsed by virtue 
of the limitation period provided in the bond as follows: 
"5. No suit, action, or proceeding by reason 
of any default, whatever, shall be brought on this 
Bond after two (2) years from the date on which 
the final payment under the contract falls due, 
provided, however, that in the event there exists 
or is pending any collateral litigation which has 
the effect of making it impossible for any Obligee 
under this Bond to determine its rights hereunder, 
a suit, action, or other proceeding under this 
Bond may be instituted within six (6) months 
after entry of final judgment in said collateral 
litigation." (Ex. Pr.-l) 
The collateral litigation necessary to determine the 
rights of the obligees on the bond terminated October 
5, 1955. (Tit. Co. E. 13). Under the terms of the bond 
above set forth, any action against the Surety on the 
bond was required to be commenced no later than April 
4, 1956. Wright-Wirthlin brought no action within that 
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time. It could not breath new life into its stale claim 
by assigning it back to Felt, 
It should be noted here, that the Hartford interposed 
the assignment as a complete defense, since it was a 
clear violation on the part of Felt of the primary con-
struction contract (Ex. Pr-2, fl-15). The court did not 
treat it as a complete defense, but rather as a partial 
defense. The error, if any, was in Felt's favor, and it 
has no grounds upon which to complain. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPERLY 
RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER TO FELT'S 
COMPLAINT. 
Felt apparently in desperation, seeks to take refuge 
in technical rules of pleading, and asserts that the Hart-
ford's defense of assignment was not properly or timely 
raised. We invite the court's attention to paragraph 4 
of the fourth defense in our answer to Felt's complaint 
(Felt R. 27), wherein the Hartford specifically alleged 
that Felt had breached its contract with Cassady by as-
signing its rights thereunder, directly contrary to the 
provisions of the primary construction contract (Ex. 
Pr-2, par. 15). We do not know what better notice we 
could have given to Felt that we were relying upon the 
assignment as a defense. It was clearly and specifically 
pleaded. 
Felt now complains that this was a plea in abate-
ment, which had to be specially pleaded. That may 
have been true under the rules of common law pleading, 
but it was not generally true under the Codes, and it 
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most certainly is not true under the form of pleading 
provided by the Utah Rules. In 41 Am. Jur . at page 397, 
the rule in this regard under Code Practice, is stated 
as follows: 
"Some defenses may now be raised by a gen-
eral denial that under the common-law system of 
pleading required a plea in abatement. An objec-
tion that the plaintiff is not the real party in 
interest, or that his title to the cause of action 
is defective, if not apparent on the face of the 
record, is properly made at common law by a 
plea in abatement, whereas under the codes a 
general denial will serve the purpose" (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The Utah Rules provide a form of notice pleading. 
All that is necessary is to give the adverse party notice 
of the claim to be made. We submit that notice was given 
in clear and unequivocal language, by express pleading. 
If there remains any doubt in the matter, we invite at-
tention to the provisions of Rule 1, U. R. C. P., which 
provides, in part, as follows: 
"(a) * * * They [the rules] shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." 
In commenting on a similar provision in the Federal 
Rules, it is said in 2 Moore's Federal Practice, pages 
56-7: 
"In cases construing the Rules courts have 
frequently reiterated the maxim of liberal con-
struction. The objective of the Rules has been 
variously phrased: (1) 'Decisions are to be on 
the merits and not on procedural niceties/; (2) 
Ho secure a disposition of litigation on the merits 
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rather than by collateral methodsf (3) Ho reduce 
the amount of litigation, to narrow the issues to 
avoid surprises and to promote justice'; (4) Ho 
achieve uniformity'; (5) 'to avoid a strict techni-
cal interpretation which might work a hardship 
on the litigants1'; Howsoever worded, liberality 
is the canon of construction." (Emphasis ours.) 
The fact that the court did not give to this defense 
the full effect which we claimed for it, is certainly nothing 
about which Felt can legitimately complain. It was fully 
apprised that Hartford relied upon the assignment as 
a ground of defense, and while the Hartford contended, 
and still contends, that said assignment is a complete de-
fense to Felt's action, Felt cannot complain that the 
court found it was only a partial defense. 
POINT III. 
THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSADY'S 
SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWLEDGE, NOR 
CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE 
HARTFORD, OR ESTOP IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR 
WHICH IT CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND 
ON THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND. 
All of the plaintiffs have argued in their briefs, 
either inferentially, or directly, that Hartford stands in 
the shoes of Cassady, and that because Cassady did or 
neglected to do, certain things, Hartford is estopped 
from raising, or has waived, defenses which it might 
otherwise have. This argument is a fallacy. The surety 
limited its undertaking to certain terms and conditions 
among which were that Cassady would be paid in ac-
cordance with the terms and provisions of the primary 
construction contract, and that all of the obligees per-
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form their respective obligations under their respective 
contractual agreements. 
It is argued that Cassady was aware that Felt's 
only source of money was from Prudential Federal, and 
that Prudential Federal would not make funds available 
until proper contracts were signed and mortgages re-
corded. From this, it is argued that Cassady should not 
have started to build on any particular lot until it was 
sold and ,a mortgage recorded, and this, despite the fact 
that Cassady was obligated by the express terms of his 
contract to go forward within ten days and complete 
within six months. Felt of course, knew that Cassady 
relied upon the course of construction payments agreed 
by Felt to be paid in accordance with the terms of the 
primary construction contract. Eegardless of the effect 
which Cassady's knowledge had upon his own rights, 
(and we do not believe it had any), it could in no way 
impair the rights of the Hartford. The Hartford's bond 
specifically refers to the construction contract, and must 
be construed in light of it. Hartford was entitled to rely 
on its terms and provisions. There is nothing in the 
record to show that Hartford had any knowledge con-
cerning Felt's limited financial circumstances, or its 
inability to perform. Neither is there anything in the 
record to show that Hartford at any time waived the 
rights for which it contracted in its bond. Eegardless 
of any knowledge which Cassady may have had, or any-
thing which Cassady may have done, such action on his 
part could not and did not affect the rights of the Hart-
ford since there is no showing in the record that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Hartford had such knowledge, or that it acquiesced in, 
or consented to such acts. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE 
THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIOR BREACHES ON THE 
PART OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE HARTFORD DID 
NOT BY SIGNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
WAIVE ANY BREACHES UPON THE PART OF FELT OR 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL. 
All of the plaintiffs contend or assume, that the 
supplemental agreement (Ex. Pr-3), more or less wiped 
the slate clean, and that from that point forward the 
parties started afresh. In other words, all past sins were 
forgiven. This is not true. There is an admission in said 
agreement that up to the time of its execution, Prudential 
Federal had made payments in accordance with, and 
performed its obligations under the loan agreement. 
However, the Hartford was not a party to that portion 
of the agreement, did not either expressly or inferentially 
agree to it, and expressly limited its concurrence in the 
.agreement to certain modifications in the primary con-
struction contract. The language of Hartford's concur-
rence is as follows : 
"HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEM-
NITY COMPANY, as surety on the bond of CAS-
SADY COMPANY, INC., does hereby consent to 
amended paragraphs 22 and 23, and 7 of the Con-
struction contract in connection with which its 
bond has been given." (Pr-6). 
Paragraph 22 of the primary construction agree-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
ment, as modified by the supplemental agreement, was 
changed only in the following particulars: 
(1) The number of houses to be built under each 
of the three different floor plans was changed slightly. 
(2) Cassady would be compensated for extras only 
if they were agreed to in writing. (Under the original 
agreement there was no provision that extras should be 
in writing.) 
(3) Extras had to be approved by the Veterans 
Administration. 
Paragraph 23 was amended to give Prudential Fed-
eral discretion as to the manner and amounts of pay-
ments to Cassady, subject, however to the following 
provision: 
"In no event, however, shall the payments be 
less than those prescribed in this paragraph 23 
prior to this amendment." 
At no time was there any agreement that failure 
to make timely payments should be excused. On the con-
trary all of the contractual provisions specifically re-
quired payments according to a schedule based on course 
of construction. It should also be observed, that there is 
nothing in the supplemental agreement wherein or where-
by any party thereto admits or agrees that Felt had 
performed its obligations in accordance with the primary 
construction contract. And Felt itself, at page 22 of its 
brief, admits that there were breaches. 
It was of course, necessary that the Hartford con-
sent to that portion of the supplemental agreement 
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wherein the time for completion by Cassady was ex-
tended. Had the consent of the Hartford not been ob-
tained, it would have been exonerated from liability 
under the bond under familiar principles of suretyship 
law. Likewise, it was .advisable, if not absolutely neces-
sary, to obtain the Hartford's consent to the other modi-
fications in the primary construction contract so that 
there could be no question of its being exonerated by 
reason of changing its terms. However, the Hartford's 
concurrence in this agreement was strictly and carefully 
limited to those matters. It specifically did not .agree 
that Prudential Federal had performed all of its con-
tractual obligations, nor did it admit that .any other 
party had performed its contractual obligations, nor 
did it waive .any of the rights for which it had contracted 
under the specific terms of its bond. Antecedent breaches 
were in no wise excused and there is nothing in the 
record to show that at the time of the Supplemental 
Agreement the Hartford had knowledge of such breaches. 
Felt has suggested that by allowing the cost of 
renting a power generator as an offset against Felt's 
judgment, Felt's breach in failing to provide a power 
connection at the inception of the project is thus rectified. 
This is analogous to suggesting that a blood transfusion, 
administered after the death of the patient, rectifies the 
negligence of the physician in failing to give it at the 
time of surgery. At the beginning of the project, funds 
were sorely needed. A relatively small amount of money 
would have kept the project going smoothly. But once 
it had turned into a lemon, no amount of money could 
have saved it. Like a small cancer, easily eradicated in 
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its initial phases, this project was neglected by the 
doctor (Felt) until the cancer metastasized throughout 
the body of the victim. By then major surgery could 
not cure the patient. Any medicine administered at that 
late date could have only a mild pallative effect. 
POINT V. 
FELT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING ITS ACTION 
AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL BY THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTION 16-9-3, U. C. A., 1953. 
In meeting the contentions made under Point VI 
of our original brief, Felt ignores completely the terms 
and provisions of Sec. 16-9-3, U.C.A. 1953. Felt seeks to 
circumvent our argument by contending that in filing 
this law suit and prosecuting this appeal, it is not en-
gaging in business in Utah. That is entirely beside the 
point. When Felt entered into this promotion for the 
construction of 100 homes, it was beyond the perad-
venture of any doubt engaging in business in Utah. This 
it recognized itself and took the steps to qualify to do 
business in this state. Having done so, it was, for the 
time it remained properly qualified, entitled to all of 
the rights and privileges of any other corporation law-
fully doing business in this state. However, when Felt's 
franchise was forfeited, it forfeited whatever rights it 
had accrued up to that time. Sec. 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953. 
One of those rights was the right to bring actions in 
the Utah courts. The disabilities of non-complying for-
eign corporations are specifically set forth in Sec. 16-9-3, 
U.C.A., 1953. One of those disabilities is clearly and un-
equivocally the right to sue, prosecute or maintain any 
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action or suit in any of the courts of this state on any 
claim arising out of, or growing out of any contract, 
agreement or transaction, made or entered into in this 
state by such corporation. The language of the statute 
is clear and unequivocal. 
The cases cited by Felt, do not in the least support 
or tend to support its position. The case of George R. 
Barse Livestock Company v. The Range Valley Cattle 
Co., et al.} 16 Ut. 59, 50 Pac. 630, simply holds that a 
foreign corporation not doing business in this state, 
which acquired, outside of this state, a chose en action 
against the defendant, a resident of this state, could bring 
its action in the Utah courts without qualifying as a 
foreign corporation. The case of Mar chant v. National 
Reserve Co. of America, 137 Pac. (2d) 331, simply dis-
cussed what does and does not constitute the doing of 
business in this state, and says nothing whatsoever as 
to the disabilities of noncomplying foreign corporations, 
and particularly as to their right to use the Utah courts. 
Neither case is of any assistance whatsoever in solving 
the problems in the case ,at bar. 
POINT VI. 
HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF 
THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER. 
In our original brief, we stated that "the amount of 
damages awarded to . . . Prudential Federal and Felt" 
was not an issue. We made the statement simply to ex-
plain to the court why we did not detail the facts upon 
which those plaintiffs' losses were claimed. We certainly 
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did not intend to admit, and we are quite amazed that 
anyone would believe that we admitted, by this state-
ment, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages in 
some amount. However, Prudential Federal has seized 
upon this statement with such vigor ,and has referred to 
it so many times in its brief, that we feel it appropriate 
to clarify any doubt or ambiguity which might exist. 
WE DO NOT ADMIT THAT PRUDENTIAL FED-
ERAL OR ANY OTHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN THESE CASES. We 
most certainly would not have appealed and prepared 
these elaborate briefs had we intended to make any such 
admission. All we meant by the statement in our original 
brief, was that we do not desire, on this appeal, to attack 
the formula by which the court calculated the damages, 
the court having first found that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to recover damages. We do not necessarily admit 
that the court's formula was correct. All we say, is that 
right or not, we are not questioning it on this appeal. 
What we are contending is that the plaintiffs should 
not have been awarded any damages, and that judgment 
should have been rendered in each case in favor of the 
defendant. That is what we contended below, and what 
we contend here. We trust that the foregoing will serve 
to eliminate or clarify any ambiguity which heretofore 
existed as a result of the statement made in our original 
brief. 
POINT VII. 
HARTFORD DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE OBLIGEES WERE JOINT AND SEVERAL. 
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In order to demonstrate that its construction of the 
bond is the correct one, Prudential Federal suggests as an 
alternative construction an interpretation which it char-
acterized as absurd. We agree. This interpretation is 
stated on page 65 of Prudential Federal's brief to be 
Hartford's theory. This we disclaim. We have never 
contended, and we do not now contend, that the three 
obligees on the bond had joint and several obligations to 
make payments to Cassady. What we do contend, and 
what the bond plainly provides, is that in the event pay-
ments are not made to Cassady in accordance with the 
terms of the primary contract, that the surety is ex-
onerated from liability to each of the obligees on the 
bond. Plainly the Morningside Heights building project 
could not succeed unless everyone interested in it faith-
fully performed his obligations. Quite obviously Felt 
and Prudential Federal, and to a lesser degree, the Tille 
Company, had it within their power to destroy the suc-
cess of the project by not complying with their contractual 
agreements. Hartford certainly would not have under-
taken to secure performance by Cassady without at the 
same time contracting for full performance by all of the 
other parties. To have done otherwise would have been 
little short of madness. In fact Hartford agreed to write 
this bond only after a long period of negotiation. While 
the Hartford did not require, nor did any contractual 
instrument require, that either Prudential Federal or the 
Title Company, guarantee payment to Cassady by Felt, 
Hartford, in clear and unequivocal language, limited its 
liability, and stated that it would not be liable if pay-
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ments were not made "in reasonable compliance with the 
terms of" the construction contract, or if the other obli-
gees failed to perform their obligations. In light of the 
circumstances under which the parties contracted, this 
provision seems not only reasonable but indispensable. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that the plaintiffs have 
failed to meet the arguments advanced by the Hartford 
in its original brief; that there is no merit to Felt's ap-
peal; and that the judgment of the trial court in each 
case should be reversed with directions to enter judg-
ment in favor of the defendant and against each of the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN 
& CHRISTENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Company. 
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